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ABSTRACT 
The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan is one of the main sources of 
criminal law in the country, not because it defines crimes and 
punishments, but because it establishes the fundamental, individual 
rights and liberties that impact criminal law and procedure. Among 
these is the principle of legality, as expressed in Article 27 of the 
Afghan Constitution. The principle of legality is the doctrine that no 
person shall be held criminally liable for any conduct unless a statute 
criminalizing that conduct precedes it. This doctrine is based on the 
idea that it would be unjust to announce that an act is illegal, or 
increase the degree of punishment for a crime, after that act has been 
committed. This doctrine however is complicated by Article 130 of the 
Afghan Constitution, in which courts are directed to use Hanafi Fiqh 
(jurisprudence) to fill in the statutory gaps when no provision in the 
Constitution or other Afghan statutes offers a path to justice. This 
Article explains that, based on Article 130, many criminal courts have 
used Hanafi jurisprudence to justify convicting individuals for crimes 
or subjecting individuals to punishments that exist under certain 
interpretations of Hanafi jurisprudence, but the crimes and 
punishments are not codified in the Afghan Criminal Code.  This 
Article argues that these interpretations of Article 130 not only 
violate the principle of legality set forth in Article 27 of the Afghan 
Constitution, but also contradict international criminal law including 
the principles of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court. In 
addition, this Article asserts that differences in judicial training are at 
the root of why some jurists interpret Article 130 to allow for this 
level of discretion and some do not.  Finally, this Article suggests that 
the problem of inconsistent interpretation of Article 130 might be 
HASHIMI (DO NOT DELETE) 8/29/2017  12:34 PM 
2017] Defending the Principle of Legality in Afghanistan: 187 
Toward a Unified Interpretation of Article 130 
to the Afghan Constitution 
helped by (1) using a similar approach as was used in Iran and 
Egypt, amending the Penal Code to include all legally recognized 
Tazir crimes (action or omission that is criminalized by an Islamic 
state or ruler) and (2) developing a system of secondary sources, like 
annotated codes, legal encyclopedias, and treatises, to help to shape 
future practice and bring more stability and consistency to judicial 
interpretation and rule of law. 
INTRODUCTION 
The internationally recognized doctrine of the “principle of 
legality” requires the existence of enforceable law before a person can 
be held criminally liable for their conduct.1 The doctrine is prescribed 
in Article 27 of the Afghan Constitution, which states the following: 
No deed shall be considered a crime unless ruled by a law2 
promulgated prior to commitment of the offense. No one shall be 
pursued, arrested, or detained without due process of law. No one 
shall be punished without the decision of an authoritative court 
taken in accordance with the provisions of the law, promulgated 
prior to commitment of the offense.3 
Despite this provision, there continues to be instances in which this 
principle is flouted, primarily through the discretion perceived by 
some in Article 130 of Constitution of Afghanistan. Article 130 
appears to grant judges the ability to punish an act that is not defined 
as a crime by codified Afghan statutes, if an act is deemed punishable 
 
1 The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; 1057 U.N.T.S. 407. See Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, art 
22, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90/37 ILM 1002 (1998)/(2002) ATS 15; see Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 11, para. 2, G.A. Res. 217(III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); see European Convention on Human Rights art. 7, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; see also American Convention on Human Rights art. 9, Nov. 
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
2 The above text is taken from an unofficial translation of the official Pashto and Dari 
version. The translation of Pashto term “Qanun” to “law” is not entirely accurate. To the 
best of my knowledge the term “Qanun” should be translated to “statute.” Notably, the 
Rome Statute of International Criminal Court defines principle of legality in its Article 22, 
where it uses the term “statute” instead of law. This distinction makes a difference because 
the term “law” has broad meaning and incorporates doctrine from a wide range of sources, 
including statutes, judicial precedents, and customary law, to name a few. 
3 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 818 1382 (2004). 
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by Hanafi Fiqh (interpretations of Islamic law according to the Hanafi 
school of thought). 
Article 130 states the following: 
When there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws4 
regarding ruling on an issue, the court’s decisions shall be within 
the limits of this Constitution in compliance with Hanafî 
jurisprudence and, within the limits set by this Constitution, rule in 
a way that attains justice in the best manner.5 
Thus, Article 130 grants the judiciary the right to turn to Hanafi 
jurisprudence for guidance in cases when the court finds an injustice 
or inequity, but there is no applicable, relevant provision of statute in 
the Afghan Constitution or statutes.6 The need for action under Tazir 
arises when the social norm opposes conduct where there is no 
established legal norm. 
In over a thousand cases since 2004, judges have used this 
provision to justify holding defendants criminally liable where no 
crime has been defined by an enacted statute.7 For example, in the 
western Herat province of Afghanistan, a primary criminal court 
convicted and sentenced three men for selling dog meat.8 The court 
sentenced two of them to 15 years imprisonment and another, an 
accomplice, was sentenced to three years in prison.9 In other reports, 
80 out of 100 women who were incarcerated in the Kabul Pul-
Charkhi Prison had been convicted of having run away from home.10 
However, selling dog meat and running away from home are not 
crimes under the Afghan Penal Code. Despite the fact that Article 130 
 
4 As discussed above, the term “laws” is not an accurate translation of the Pashto/Dari 
version of the official Constitution of Afghanistan: the exact word is “statutes.” 
5 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 818 1382 (2004). 
6 Id.; see also Meininghaus Esther, Bonn: Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung Center 
for Development Research (ZEF) Report 2007: Legal Pluralism in Afghanistan, 10 (2007). 
7 From different reports, it appears that more than 1000 criminal cases have been 
decided based on Article 130 of the Constitution of Afghanistan. See Farzana Wahidy, I 
Had to Run Away: The imprisonment of Women and Girls for “Moral Crimes” in 
Afghanistan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (2011), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/03/28/i    
-had-run-away/imprisonment-women-and-girls-moral-crimes-afghanistan. 
8 Selling dog meat perpetrators should be punished, AFGHANISTAN MEDIA NETWORK 
(Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.afghanpaper.com/nbody.php?id=84737. 
9 Sellers of dog meat jailed for 13 Years in Herat Province, KHAAMA PRESS (Jan. 15 
2015), http://www.khaama.com/sellers-of-dog-meat-jailed-for-13-years-in-herat-province 
-8950. 
10 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, TEN YEARS OF THE AFGHAN CONSTITUTION: WHAT 
ARE THE ISSUES? 25 (AREU eds., 2014). 
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allows some judicial discretion, this practice of disregarding the 
principle of legality and holding individuals criminally liable for 
crimes and punishments that exist only in Islamic law violates Article 
27 of the Afghan Constitution and contravenes constitutional 
provisions that protect individual rights and liberties. 
This Article argues that for Afghanistan’s Constitution to be  
internally consistent and to preserve the rights guaranteed by Article 
27, Article 130 should be interpreted to apply only to civil cases—not 
criminal cases. In particular, this Article maintains that the practice of 
invoking Article 130 in criminal cases stems from a misunderstanding 
of the language within the provision itself, language that states, “[I]f 
there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws about a case . . . 
within the limits set by this Constitution.”11 Article 130 of the 
Constitution states that the Hanafi Fiqh should be applied within the 
limits of the Constitution; Article 27, which states that no act shall be 
considered crime without determined by statute, is in itself a limit. 
Hence, a case does not necessarily include all civil, criminal, and 
commercial cases. Criminal cases could and must be excluded from 
the interpretation of Article 130. 
As a solution to this problem, this Article recommends initiating 
supplemental training for judges on how to interpret Articles 27 and 
130. In addition, it recommends that the Supreme Court of 
Afghanistan issue a decree clarifying that Article 130 applies only to 
civil and commercial cases. 
Part I of this Article focuses on the internationally recognized 
meaning of the principle of legality and related doctrines, such as the 
rule of lenity, narrow interpretation of criminal statutes, and non-
retroactivity. Part II aims to provide the necessary background for 
understanding how and why upholding the principle of legality proves 
so difficult in Afghanistan. Part III explains how the principle of 
legality appears in the different sources of law that govern 
Afghanistan, including Islam, the Afghan Constitution, Afghan 
Codes, and treaties. Finally, Part IV illustrates possible steps to be 
taken in order to strengthen the principle of legality in Afghanistan, 
providing some recommendations that might solve the problems of 
the inconsistency in the application and interpretations of Article 130, 
 
11 QANUNI ASSASI JUMHURI ISLMAI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC  OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 818 1382 (2004). 
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including creating a committee charged with developing secondary 
sources to model educated and reasonable interpretations of statutes 
and constitutional provisions. 
I 
UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
The principle of legality originates from the belief that all people 
deserve to know what conduct constitutes a crime and what 
punishment flows from a conviction for that crime.12 The typical 
Latin phrase associated with this principle is “nullum crimen, nulla 
poena sine lege,” meaning that there is no crime or punishment 
without a statute.13 Under this principle, holding an individual liable 
for committing an act that was not expressly prohibited when the act 
was committed is neither fair nor just.14 However, after a law is 
enacted, all individuals are obliged to obey the law whether they are 
aware of the law or not. This means that no person or entity is 
superior to the law, and ignorance of a law is not a defense, except in 
the very rare case of misinterpretation of law.15 
The principle of legality primarily concerns notice: an actor should 
have the reasonable ability to know whether his or her behavior is 
criminal.16 It is a foundational concept that underlies fair trial 
standards and is intended to assure the rule of law in criminal 
proceedings.17 The principle keeps the authority of defining crimes 
with the legislature, prevents judges and law enforcement agencies 
from misusing their power, and distinguishes criminal actions from 
lawful actions.18 The principle also prevents arbitrary prosecution.19 
Germany provides an instructive example of the principle of 
legality in national law. In German, the term Rechtsstaat means “rule 
 
12 DANIEL E. HALL, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 36−37 (6th ed. 2011). 
13 MOHAMMAD ASHRAF RASOLI,. MAHAKIMA-YE ADILANA [FAIR TRIAL] 143, 1393 
(2014). 
14 HALL, supra note 12, at 36−37. 
15 QANUNI JAZAI JUMHURI AFGHANISTAN [PENAL CODE OF REPUBLIC OF 
AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 347 1355 (1976); see generally RASOLI, supra note 
13. 
16 UNA AU ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL LAW OF AFGHANISTAN 25 
(ALEP eds., 2009). 
17 RASOLI, supra note 13, at 13. 
18 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 149. 
19 RASOLI, supra note 13, at 143; see also KENNETHS S.GALLANT. THE PRINCIPLE OF 
LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 274 (Cambridge Univ. 
eds., 2009). 
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of law and the principle of legal state,” and this doctrine requires 
decisions—at least in serious cases—to be made according to law.20 
As part of this doctrine, Rechtsstaat limits the power of the state in 
order to protect citizens form the arbitrary exercise of law 
enforcement agencies. To ensure the uniform application of law, the 
German legal system limits the discretion of its prosecutors through 
the principle of legality. Rechtsstaat is practiced in conjunction with 
mandatory prosecution.21 Accordingly, a German prosecutor is 
obliged to prosecute a criminal case when sufficient factual evidence 
shows that a crime has been committed.22 Mandatory prosecution has 
been part of the criminal procedure code since its adoption in 1877.23 
While recent amendments give prosecutors more discretionary 
decision-making authority, there continues to be strict oversight of 
prosecutors to ensure that they follow Rechtsstaat.24 
As another example, the French civil law system reflects the 
principle of legality through its requirement that the legislative branch 
promulgate a statue prior to enforcement entities holding conduct 
criminally liable.25 The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen enshrines the principle that everyone deserves to know 
which act constitutes a crime and which specific law applies to an 
alleged crime.26 The French system emphasizes that any prohibition 
of an act must be announced and enacted in statutory form, nullum 
crimen sine praevia lege scripta.27 
Legal systems that follow this principle of legality agree that 
judges and law enforcement agencies should not punish a defendant 
arbitrarily or retroactively.28 Most importantly, a person should not be 
convicted of a crime if that action was not a crime at the time it 
 
20 Dietmar von der Pfordten, On the Foundations of the Rule of Law and the Principle 
of the Legal State/Rechtsstaat, THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE 
LEGAL STATE (Rechtsstaat), 15 (Silkenat James ed., 2013). 
21 SHAWN MARIE BOYNE, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN GERMANY’S 
RECHTSSTAAT: VARIETIES OF PRACTICE AND THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH 4 (2007). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 GALLANT, supra note 19, at 48. 
26 Id. at 49. 
27 Id. at 48-49 (explaining that while historically in common law countries judges 
defined serious crimes, today most common law countries define crimes by statute). 
28 RASOLI, supra note 13, at 143−45. 
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occurred; so, criminalizing an act or omission prior to enactment of 
criminality through the legislative branch is strongly prohibited.29 
Judicial temperance is thus inherent in the principle of legality. 
While interpreting penal statues, judges should give leniency to the 
defendant and must not convict a person without a clear and 
reasonable justification.30 Further, no entity, including judges, can 
consider an act to be a crime based on opinion or public welfare 
arguments, nor can judges sentence a person to a punishment that is 
not mentioned in penal statutes based on the same reasons.31 The 
principle of legality helps to prevent both the initiation of a criminal 
case on one’s own initiative or the seeking of retributive justice.32 
Instead, it requires that prosecution of a criminal, from the allegation 
of criminal behavior to the execution of a final decision of the 
authorized court, shall be based on the enacted laws.33 
Implementation of the principle of legality has two important legal 
effects: a narrow interpretation of penal statutes and preventing 
retroactivity of criminal law.34 Broad interpretations lead to the 
creation of new offenses after conduct has occurred: a retroactive 
criminalization of behavior.35 In order to stifle broad interpretations of 
law, the principle of legality requires that a legislature pass penal 
statutes without ambiguities and vague rules.36 
Other judicial doctrines weigh in favor of a strict application of the 
principle of legality. The classic doctrine of lenity, expressly adopted 
into the Rome Statute,37 requires that ambiguous criminal laws should 
be interpreted in favor of the defendant. Article 22 (2) of the Rome 
Statute clarifies that the definition of a crime shall be strictly 
construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In fact, the classic 
school of criminal law opposes the analogical interpretation of 
criminal law.38 According to this school, analogical interpretation 
 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 146. 
31 Id. at 41−43. 
32 GALLANT, supra note 19, at 53. 
33 Id. 
34 HAFIZULLAH DANISH, HUQOQ-YE ZAZAI HUMOMI [GENERAL CRIMINAL LAW] 
50−51 1 (1st ed. 2014). 
35 GALLANT, supra note 19, at 257. 
36 Id. 
37 RSICC, supra note 1; see also Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in 
the Rome Statute. 10 CRIM. L.F. 1, 4 (1999). 
38 DANISH, supra note 34, at 56. 
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creates a new crime and consequently contradicts the principle of 
legality.39 
U.S. courts follow the same rule of lenity40 and also employ a 
related doctrine, “void for vagueness.” Both stem from the Sixth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the right “to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.”41 If criminal 
statutes are drafted such that a reasonable person cannot understand 
them, the statute is constitutionally rendered void for vagueness.42 For 
example, in the case of Franklin v. State, the supreme court of Florida 
announced the state’s felony ban on sodomy was unconstitutionally 
vague.43 The statute used the terms “abominable and detestable crime 
against nature,” which the court held that the language was not clear 
for an average person of common intelligence.44 If the legislature 
intended to criminalize oral sex or only anal sex, then the statute 
should have included that specific language.45 
The void for vagueness doctrine is used as an instrument to support 
predictability and foreseeability in the interpretation of criminal law.46 
For example, in the case of Papachristou et al. v. City of Jacksonville, 
the Supreme Court stated that the Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance 
was unconstitutionally vague.47 Based on that law, police had the 
arbitrary discretion to arrest individuals for “nightwalking” or 
“habitually living ‘without visible means of support.’”48 Like in 
Franklin, the Court held that the language of the statute was vague 
and thus unconstitutional.49 
 
39 Id. 
40 See also generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (the 
doctrine derived from the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 
U.S Constitution). 
41 See generally United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). 
42 GABRIEL HALLEVY. A MODERN TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 139 (1st ed. 2010). 
43 See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21, 23 (Fla. 1971). 
44 Id. at 24. 
45 Id. 
46 Michele Boggiani. Principio di deteminatezza and the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine 
in Constitutional Litigation: The Italian Corte Costituzionale and the United States 
Supreme Court, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW−THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 180 
(Laura Pineschi ed., 2015). 
47 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
48 Id. at 164. 
49 Id. at 171. 
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Non-retroactivity of criminal law is also a worldwide standard. It is 
strictly prohibited to create a crime retroactively through national or 
international law (including treaty law, customary international law, 
and general principles of law recognized by the community of 
nations).50 The overall concern is that retroactive application of 
criminal law may create a new crime and consequently deprive an 
individual of their liberty. This principle appears in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)51 and the Rome 
Statute of International Criminal Court,52 both of which explicitly 
recognize the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law and ensure 
legal predictability and certainty.53 Notably, the ICCPR has 74 
signatories and 168 parties, including Afghanistan.54 This concept is 
also stipulated in Article 24 of the Rome Statute of International 
Criminal Court,55 which has been ratified or acceded by 123 countries 
including Afghanistan.56 Furthermore, most Islamic countries have 
also incorporated the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law 
 
50 See Muhammad Salim al’ Awwa, The Basis of Islamic Penal Legislating, in ISLAMIC 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 133 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,1st ed. 1982). 
51 The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171; 1057 U.N.T.S. 407 (stating “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, 
under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence 
was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law 
for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.”). 
52 RSICC, supra note 1. 
53 ALEXANDRA GUHR ET AL., MAX PLANCK MANUAL ON FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS 13 
(4th ed. 2009). 
54 International Covenant on Civil and Political Right, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4& 
chapter=4 &lang=en (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
55 Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, art 22, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90/37 ILM 1002 (1998)/[2002] ATS 15 (stating “no person shall be criminally responsible 
under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute. In the event of a 
change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgment, the law more 
favorable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply”). 
56 UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 54. 
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into their constitutions or penal codes.57 This principle is specifically 
stipulated in Article 21 of the Penal Code of 1976 of Afghanistan.58 
In the sections that follow, this Article explains how the principle 
of legality and its related doctrines are expressed and interpreted in 
the Afghan legal context. 
II 
LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF AFGHANISTAN 
The complexities of Afghanistan’s geography and religious, 
cultural, and political history have led to an equally complex legal 
landscape that incorporates various cultural traditions and religious 
perspectives.59 As part of this complexity, the Afghan legal system 
reflects three different components: Sharia Law, Civil Law, and 
Customary Law.60 Sometimes these components complement one 
another or overlap, and sometimes they contradict one another.61  This 
section gives background needed to understand the complexities 
underlying the principle of legality in Afghanistan. 
Throughout its history, the legal system of Afghanistan has been 
based on Islamic law and customary law.62 In the late nineteenth 
century during the reign of King Abdurahman Khan, the codification 
process began, and state legal codes became the exclusive source of 
legal authority; nevertheless, these laws were still firmly based on 
Islamic Law.63 
 
57 GALLANT, supra note 19, at 54. (Gallant identifies laws from many Islamic countries 
including the Afghanistan Const. art. 27; Azerbaijan Const. art. 71(VIII); Bangladesh 
Const. art. 35(1); Bangladesh Const. art. 35(1); Egypt Const. arts. 66, 187; Indonesia 
Const. art. 28I(1); Iran Const. art. 169; Iraq Const. art. 19(2, 10); Kuwait Const. art. 32; 
Kyrgyzstan Const. art. 85(10); Malaysia Const. art. 7(1); Pakistan Const. art. 12(1); 
Romania Const. art. 15(2); and so on.). 
58 QANUNI JAZAI JUMHURI AFGHANISTAN [PENAL CODE OF REPUBLIC OF 
AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 347 1355 (1976). 
59 Adam Ritscher, A Brief History of Afghanistan, http://www.afghangovernment.com 
/briefhistory.htm (last visited Feb 20, 2016). 
60 Meininghaus Esther, Bonn: Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung Center for 
Development Research (ZEF) Report 2007: Legal Pluralism in Afghanistan, 2 (2007). 
61 Id. at 3. 
62 See generally id. 
63 Katherine McCullough, Out with the Old and in with the New: The Long Struggle for 
Judicial Reform in Afghanistan, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 821, 825 (2006). 
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Islam has also traditionally held a prominent place in the 
constitutions of Afghanistan.64 It has been considered the religion of 
the state not only in the 2004 Constitution, but also in the 1964 and 
1977 Constitutions.65 In accordance with the 1964 Constitution, the 
King was required to be a Muslim and the State was required to 
practice religious rites in accordance with Hanafi Fiqh 
(jurisprudence).66 This constitution also required that no law should 
be passed in contradiction to the principles of Islam.67  
Similar provisions were included in the 2004 Constitution of 
Afghanistan. Moreover, Article 130 of the Constitution refers judges 
to Hanafi jurisprudence for guidance when there is no provision 
regarding the enacted laws.68 However, similar to other countries such 
as Egypt, Turkey, and Libya, Afghanistan also employs the structure 
of the civil law system. 
A. The Relationship Between Islam and the Afghan Constitution 
and Codes 
Islam has an important place in the laws of Afghanistan. It has 
played a central role in the country’s history and in the formation of 
its national identity. Hence, all laws including criminal law are 
supposed to be passed in compliance with Sharia Law. 
Indeed, the concept of “beliefs and provisions” opens the door to 
broad interpretations.69 Under a broad interpretation, beliefs and 
provisions could refer not only to Sharia Law but also to the Hanafi 
Fiqh, and perhaps even to other Islamic law doctrine. With this 
language, the 2004 Constitution designed a legal system intertwined 
with Islam, incorporating the Hanafi school of jurisprudence by 
reference.70 
 
64 Esther, supra note 60, at 11. 
65 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 818 1382 (2004). 
66 QANUNI ASSASSI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] Official 
Gazette No. 12 1343 (1964); see also Esther, supra note 60, at 8. 
67 Thier J. Alexander, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
557, 565 (2007). 
68 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 818 1382 (2004). 
69 Said Mahmoudi, The Shari’a in the New Afghan Constitution: Contradiction or 
Compliment?, in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND 
VÖLKERRECHT (HEIDELBERG JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 870−71 (2004). 
70 Id. 
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The language of Article 3 and Article 130 have complex 
implications for separation of powers or checks and balances in 
Afghanistan. For example, the 2004 Constitution gives the legislative 
branch the authority to define criminal or civil offenses. And while 
executive decrees are considered lawful under the Constitution, they 
may be accepted or rejected or amended by the legislative branch.71 
Nevertheless, Article 130 limits this legislative power by directing the 
judiciary to Islamic sources outside of the control of the legislative 
branch; the legislative branch has no authority to change or amend 
Sharia Law, which independently criminalizes some acts and devises 
certain punishments.72 
There are other provisions of the Constitution that add to this 
complex relationship between Islam and the State. For example, 
Article 7 of the 2004 Constitution requires the Afghan State to uphold 
international treaties, international agreements, the United Nations 
Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In addition, 
Article 121 of the Afghan Constitution explains that the Supreme 
Court can review statutes and international treaties for their 
compliance with the Constitution and interpret them in accordance 
with provisions of law.73 Juxtaposed with the requirements of Articles 
3 and 130, Articles 7 and 121 require the judicial branch to reconcile 
the sometimes-differing demands of Islam and international human 
rights law.74 For example, in accordance with Article 2 of the 
Constitution, followers of other faiths are free within the bounds of 
law in the exercise and performance of their religious rituals. Islam 
allows for Islamic da’wah (inviting to Islam), or conversion to 
Islam.75 However, Sharia Law prohibits apostasy, or the abandonment 
or renunciation of one’s religion.76 In contrast, Article 18 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all people should 
 
71 HOSSEIN GHOLAMI. BASICS OF AFGHAN LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 74−75 (Bashir 
Tanin & Valey Arya trans., 2008). 
72 See generally RASOLI, supra note 13. 
73 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 818 1382 (2004). 
74 Martin Lau, The Independence of Judges Under Islamic Law, International Law and 
the New Afghan Constitution, 64 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 918 (2004). 
75 A. Rashied Omar, The Right to Religious Conversion: Between Apostasy and 
Proselytization 2 (Aug. 1, 2006), https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/10903/uploads. 
76 Id. 
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be free to change their religion.77 In the Afghan context, these two 
provisions contradict each other. 
B. Court Structure and Judicial Training 
To understand the complexities involved in varied interpretations 
of Article 130, one must understand the court structure in Afghanistan 
and how judges are trained. The Constitution of Afghanistan is the 
sole source of required qualifications for the judges on the Afghan 
Supreme Court.78 Under Article 116 of the Constitution, the judiciary 
is an independent entity that consists of the Supreme Court, courts of 
appeals, and preliminary or trial courts.79 The Supreme Court is 
responsible for the administration of a court system consisting of 34 
provincial courts and 408 primary courts throughout Afghanistan.80 
The court with the second-highest authority is the appellate court. The 
lowest court in the hierarchical structure of the Afghan court system 
is the primary court.81 
The Supreme Court is composed of nine judges including a Chief 
Justice, all of whom are required to have higher education in the laws 
or in Islamic jurisprudence, as well as demonstrate expertise in the 
judicial system of Afghanistan.82 Thus, Supreme Court judges should 
have knowledge in both religious and statutory laws because the 
Afghan legal system is based on both Islamic law and statutory law; 
judges that lack training in either may not qualify as Supreme Court 
judges.83 
The criteria for appellate court and primary court judges are set 
forth in Article 81 of the Law on Organization and Structure of 
Judiciary Branch of the Republic of Afghanistan.84 In accordance 
with Article 81, judges can come from one of three different 
educational backgrounds: “sharia school, religious school (Madrasa), 
 
77 UNUDHR, supra note 1. 
78 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 818 1382 (2004). 
79 Id. 
80 Id.; see also AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT, THE A TO Z GUIDE 
TO AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE 77−78 (7th ed. 2009). 
81 Id. at 78. 
82 DIEHL, KATHARINA ET AL., MAX PLANCK MANUALS ON CONSTITUTION BUILDING: 
STRUCTURES AND PRINCIPLES 28 (2nd ed. 2009). 
83 Id. 
84 QANUNI TASHKIL OA SALAIT MAHAKIM JAMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [LAW ON 
THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF JUDICIARY BRANCH OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 
AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 1109 (2013). 
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and law school.”85 The Sharia school curriculum consists of Islamic 
law and jurisprudence; however, Sharia students also receive 
introduction to some subjects in national and international law.86 In 
contrast, in “law schools,” the curriculum focuses on statutory and 
international law, with some introduction to Sharia law and 
jurisprudence.87 Students in religious schools, or Madrasas, study 
generally the religion of Islam.88 Despite these discrepancies in 
educational background, each of these judges preform the same role 
in the judiciary, working in the same courts, as well as interpreting 
and applying the same laws. 
As a way to supplement their legal education and prepare them for 
service in the judiciary, Afghanistan requires future judges to attend a 
judicial Stazh (practical course), a course that runs for two years.89 
While attending this course, all students are trained in the same 
classes and same subjects: civil code, penal code, criminal and civil 
procedure, fair trial standards, criminalistics, among other topics. 90 
Later, while serving on the court, the judges also receive instruction 
through additional trainings and workshops.91 These trainings attempt 
to equip the judges with both Sharia law and positive laws of the 
state. 
III 
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY UNDER AFGHAN LAW 
This section explains how the principle of legality appears in the 
different sources of law that govern Afghanistan, including Islam, the 
Afghan Constitution, Afghan Codes, and treaties. 
 
85 Id. 
86 Interview with Abdurahim Akimi, Professor of Sharia, School of Herat University, in 
Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 10, 2016). 
87 Interview with Professor Fazel Rahman Ayoubi, Dean of Law School, Khost 
University, in Seattle, Wash. (Jan. 31, 2016). 
88 Akimi, supra note 86. 
89 Surat Bani Is- rail  XVII, 15 (explaining the law on the organization and jurisdiction 
of judiciary branch of Islamic republic of Afghanistan). 
90 A Quick Overview of the Judicial Stazh of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
http://hoqoqwaras.blogspot.com/2011/02/blog-post.html (Feb. 13, 2016). 
91 Id. 
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A. “We never punish until we have sent a messenger”92 
There are many verses of the Quran that appear to reflect the 
principle of legality and non-retroactivity of criminal law. For 
instance, the Quran states that “[w]e never punish until we have sent a 
messenger.”93 It also states “[n]ever did the lord destroy the 
townships. He had raised up in their mother (town) a messenger 
reciting unto them our revelations.”94 The Quran goes on to state that, 
“Allah has forgiven what is past, but whosoever commits it again, 
Allah will take retribution from him.”95 In addition, it emphasizes, 
“[l]et there be from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin 
right conduct and forbid indecency.”96 
Fundamentally, Sharia requires there should be no crime or 
punishment unless stated by a law prior to commitment of such 
forbidden conducts.97 God does not impose punishment upon 
individuals until they are informed about the prohibited action 
through his messenger.98 Indeed, Islamic, national, and international 
sources of law each individually exhibit this clear commitment to the 
principle of legality; however, this commitment is sometimes lost in 
in the complex reality of a mixed legal system, where these legal 
systems sometimes conflict or are susceptible to conflicting 
interpretations. 
B. Distinguishing Between Hudod, Qissas, Diat, and Tazir Crimes 
In Islamic criminal justice system, all offenses are divided into 
three categories according to the severity of penalty and nature of the 
offence.99 Hudod (specified crimes in Islam) are those crimes that 
specified by Quran and Sunnah (the actions of the Prophet of Islam) 
and have specific punishments.100 Qissas and Diat (just retaliation) are 
 
92 Surat Bani Is- rail  XVII, 15. 
93 Surat Bani Is- rail  XVII, 15. 
94 Surat Al- Qasas  XXVIII, 59. 
95 Surat al-Ma’ida V, 95 
96 Surat al-Imran V, 104. 
97 Silvia Tellenbach, Fair trial guarantees in criminal proceedings under Islamic, 
Afghan Constitutional and International Law, 64 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 929, 931 
(2004); see also KAMALI, supra note 9, at 150; see also Salim al’ Awwa, supra note 49, at 
133. 
98 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 158. 
99 Id. at 161. 
100 Id. at 157; see also ANWARULLAH, CRIMINAL LAW OF ISLAM 34 (1st ed. 1995). 
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crimes that deal with homicide and the infliction of bodily harm.101 In 
these, the discretion of punishment is left to the victim or his or her 
family.102 Tazir literally means to prevent, to honor, to moderate, to 
avoid, and to assist.103 Tazir are those crimes that are criminalized by 
the rulers.104 The privilege of law making power given to Muslims is 
complementary, not absolute. Thus, the legislation should be in 
compliance with Sharia.105 In Islam, Tazir crimes are crimes 
referenced generally in the Quran or the Hadiths, but for which 
neither source identifies or defines a punishment.106 Under Islamic 
law, punishments for Tazir crimes are, therefore, determined at the 
discretion of the judge or ruler of the state.107 Notably, there is no 
separate criminal court for hearing Hudod, Qissas, Diat or Tazir 
crimes in Afghanistan, and all courts and judges are qualified to hear 
all cases. 
In contrast to Tazir offences, Hudod crimes encompass specific 
crimes against God, and these crimes have fixed punishments 
articulated in the Quran and the Sunnah. 108 Hudod crimes include 
adultery or fornication, theft, and apostasy, among some others.109 
The set punishments for these crimes include death by stoning, lashes, 
and amputations, depending on the crime.110 In Hudod cases, because 
both the crimes and the respective punishments are considered in 
primary Islamic sources, judges exercise limited discretion, primarily 
limited to the intent of the defendant and the credibility of the 
evidence.111 
Qissas means “equality” or “equivalence”.112 Crimes governed by 
Qissas allow for certain punishments, for example in assault or 
 
101 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 157. 
102 ANWARULLAH, supra note 100, at 88. 
103 Id. at 225. 
104 Id. at 35. 
105 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law, and The Protection of Human rights 
in the Islamic criminal Justice System, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 
(Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1982). 
106 ANWARULLAH, supra note 100, at 35. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 125; see also KAMALI, supra note 10, at 157. 
109 ANWARULLAH, supra note 100, at 125. 
110 See generally ANWARULLAH, supra note 100. 
111 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 161. 
112 Bassiouni, supra note 105, at 203. 
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murder charges. For example, under this doctrine, a murder victim’s 
closest relative has a right to kill the murderer, if the court deems it 
appropriate. Again, because this doctrine is defined and described in 
Islamic sources of law, judges have little discretion. Judges hear the 
case and are responsible to ensure the proper implementation of 
retaliation through convicting the defendant based on evidence.113 
The Islamic criminal justice system has clear rules and principles 
regarding Hudod, Qissas, and Diat crimes. For Hudod crimes, there 
are specified punishments; however, the punishments for Qissas and 
Diat crimes are left to the discretion of the victim and the victim’s 
family. Families have the discretion to request punishment or to 
negotiate for compensation.114 Notably, it is debated whether 
retaliation still occurs in modern Islamic countries.115 For example, in 
Egypt, retaliation was practiced until the French Model Penal Code 
was adopted in 1883.116 Both Hudod and Qissas crimes are sanctioned 
through specified rules and regulations of Sharia. In other words, the 
crimes and the punishment of these crimes are identified. Because 
Hudod crimes are severe, the procedural rules regarding the crimes 
are characterized by their stringent requirements of proof.  Most of 
the time it is nearly impossible to prove the crime.117 
With Hudod crimes, punishments cannot be altered; thus, there is 
no minimum or maximum punishments attached to them. If someone 
commits a Hudod crime, he knows what the punishment will be. No 
one, including heads of state, legislature, or judges, can reduce or 
change the punishment for Hudod crimes. However, with Tazir 
crimes, there are grounds for general and specific pardon and such 
pardons can take place through the president or parliament. 
In Afghanistan, inconsistencies and disagreements about the 
principle of legality are most evident in cases of Tazir crimes, 
primarily because of the relationship between Article 130 and Article 
27 of the Constitution, as well as differing opinions about how those 
provisions should be interpreted.118 Regarding Hudod, Qissas, and 
 
113 Mark Cammack, Islamic Law and Crime in Contemporary Courts, 4 BERKELEY J. 
MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC L. 5 (2012). 
114 Tellenbach, supra note 97, at 931; see also GALLANT, supra note 19, at 52. 
115 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 163. 
116 Id. 
117 Mandana Knust & Rassekh Afshar, The Case of an Afghan Apostate, 10 MAX 
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 596 (2006). 
118 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 25. 
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Diat crimes, Article 1 of the Penal Code of Afghanistan has clear 
previsions that state the following: 
This penal code regulates Tazir crimes and penalties. Those 
committing crimes of “Hudod”, “Qissas and Diat” shall be punished 
according the provisions of Islamic religious law (Hana 
jurisprudence).119 
With the language of Article 1 of the Penal Code, the Code 
specifically states that determinations of Tazir crimes are governed by 
the Code itself,120 in effect, announcing that judges do not have 
absolute discretion to criminalize an act of Tazir. Instead, Tazir type 
crimes must be defined and adopted by the legislature. 
1. A Historical View of Tazir Crimes 
At the beginning of Islam, a state leader, the Caliph himself, would 
decide cases, without the assistance of courts.121 It was during the 
caliphate of Umar (Radiya Allahu Anhu),122 the second Caliph, that 
judges were appointed and justice before the law was considered an 
Islamic duty of judges.123 These judges were considered delegates of 
the Caliph or governor of a province. At that time, judges were 
resolving many different kinds of disputes, “civil or criminal,” 
according to the Quran and Sunnah.124 Specific instructions were 
given to judges, including many principles of Fiqh, describing crimes 
and punishments. For example, there was a Fiqh instruction to judges 
that extrapolation may be used from similar cases when there is no 
concrete rule in the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet on a 
matter.125 
Later during the Abbasids dynasty, additional schools of Islamic 
thought were established and gradually developed. 126 The Quran and 
Sunnah give discretion to the Caliph to make new laws in compliance 
 
119 QANUNI JAZAI JUMHURI AFGHANISTAN [PENAL CODE OF REPUBLIC OF 
AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 347 1355 (1976). 
120 Id. at 594. 
121 Lau, supra note 74, at 920. 
122 Is the Arabic word for “may God be pleased from him.” 
123 Lau, supra note 74, at 920. 
124 Id. 
125 Nazeer Ahmed, the Development of Fiqh, HISTORY OF ISLAM, http://historyofislam 
.com/fiqh-the-development-of/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
126 Lau, supra note 74, at 920. 
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with Quran and the Sunnah; in this way, Islamic scholars are 
permitted to find different solutions when new challenges or 
situations arise.127 
Different Islamic scholars have different solutions for the issues 
that were not specified in the Quran and Sunnah.128  Hence, five major 
schools of Fiqh were developed. They are the following: Hanafi, 
Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali and Ja’afariya.129 Fiqh established a doctrinal 
response to new challenges of the Islamic civilization.130 Under Fiqh, 
judges solved cases as part of a religious duty, and the judge was 
obliged to solve cases in compliance with Islamic principles such as 
equality before the law and impartiality.131 
According to Islamic jurisprudence, judges have broad discretion 
in Tazir crimes.132 Depending on the severity of crimes, they are 
authorized to impose imprisonment or the death penalty, or they can 
simply issue a warning. Different Islamic schools have different 
opinions regarding Tazir crimes. The Maliki, Hanbali, and Fiqh state 
that in certain cases, Tazir may involve the death penalty; the Hanafi 
advises a restrictive method to Tazir and determines that Tazir 
punishment must not reach the severity of the hudod or qissas 
punishments. Hudod or qissas maximums are forty lashes of the belt, 
and according to other sources, only ten lashes.133 Imprisonment was 
sanctioned as well, but later in the historical timeline.134 However, 
there remains an essential quandary: is there an “official” list of Tazir 
crimes in accordance with the Fiqh or is it is always the judge who 
decides what is wrong and punishable? 
Numerous authoritative Islamic sources maintain that individuals 
deserve to know what a crime is and its possible punishment.135 In 
fact, Abdul-Qadir Awdah, the famous Egyptian jurist and author of an 
important textbook on Islamic Criminal Law, maintains that Sharia 
 
127 Ahmed, supra note 125. 
128 Esther, supra note 60, at 11. 
129 Ahmed, supra note 125 (However, there are some other schools of Fiqh, followed 
by a small number of Muslims.). 
130 Id. 
131 Lau, supra note 74, at 921. 
132 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: A STUDY OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONS, MATRIMONIAL LAW AND THE JUDICIARY 46−47 (1985). 
133 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 25−26. 
134 Id. 
135 HALL, supra note 12, at 36−37. 
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imposes certain restrictions on the powers of judges.136 According to 
Awdah, Tazir offences are regulated by the text of Sharia alone, and it 
is a mistake to suggest that a judge has discretion or liberty to 
determine an action or omission as a crime and provide punishment 
for it.137 Awdah explains that a judge is obligated to decide first 
whether the conduct constitutes a wrongdoing according to the 
language of the text of Sharia.138 The judge should first look to a 
corresponding Tazir crime that is expressly prohibited in the Sharia 
law or jurisprudence, without specifying the exact punishment. 
Some of these crimes include perjury, usury, obscenity, insult, 
bribery, unlawful entry into private dwellings, and espionage.139  
Because these acts are forbidden by Sharia, the authority is provided 
to an Islamic state’s leader to deem the conduct criminal. Yet, Awdah 
maintains that a judge has the discretion to determine punishment for 
any of these wrongdoings, ranging from a warning to fines and 
imprisonment. In other words, the judge has substantial flexibility and 
authority regarding Tazir offences, which Awdah characterizes as 
sultah al-ikhtiyar (power to select) as opposed to sultah al-tahakkum 
(power to legislate at will).140 An alternative view, championed by 
Mohammed Salam Madkoar, the former head of Islamic Law at the 
University of Cairo, argues that Sharia Law emphasizes the societal 
interest, so broad discretion should be given to judges to prevent evils 
in the future.141 
Neither judges nor any other organ of government enjoys unlimited 
power under Islamic law. Thus, granting to the judiciary unlimited 
discretion of criminalization and punishment of an act is not allowed. 
Instead, there are two alternative solutions that adopt an expansionist 
view of Tazir. First, the head of the state determines the upper limit of 
Tazir punishment. A second view of Tazir includes capital 
punishment, citing the well-known hadith (a collections of the sayings 
and doing of the Prophet Mohammad) wherein the Prophet 
Mohammad, peace be upon him, addressed the believers, saying, 
 
136 See generally KAMALI, supra note 10. 
137 Id. at  25−26. 
138 RASOLI, supra note 13, at 143. 
139 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 25−26. 
140 Id. 
141 Islamic Law, Sharia and Fiqh, SAINT GROUP 6; http://saint-claire.org/wp-content/up 
loads/2016/01/Islamic-Law-SHARIA-AND-FIQH.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
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“[w]hen all of you have agreed on a leader and then someone tries to 
split you asunder and divide your community—kill him.”142 This 
hadith, however, deals with a specific and very serious political 
situation, and perhaps might not grant a general extension of the death 
penalty to Tazir. 
As stated before, the Quran and Sunnah stipulate specific 
punishment for Hudod crimes only. Hence, other minor crimes are 
left to the discretion of Islamic jurisprudence to criminalize them 
according to circumstantial need.143 
2. Tazir in Modern Islamic States 
In the era of applicable laws, the question arises whether criminal 
act or omission should be codified via parliament or whether it should 
be left to the discretion of judges to criminalize an act or omission. 
Various Muslim countries have different approaches to this matter. 
Saudi Arabia allows a judge to set Tazir crimes and punishments;144 
however, some restrict discretion to the punishment. In contrast, in 
1983 Ayatollah Khomeiny ordered the Iranian Parliament to enact all 
Tazir for the purpose of the unification of the application of Tazir in 
courts.145 
Today, in almost all Islamic countries, judges do not hold 
discretion in Tazir crimes; the legislature has codified Tazir, in 
compliance with Sharia, in penal codes or statutes.146 Moreover, as 
most Islamic countries have ratified a constitution, Tazir crimes 
would also be subject to any principle of legality articulated or 
adopted into those constitutions.147 
3. Distinguishing Hudod Crimes from Tazir Crimes 
Some crimes are considered both Hudod and Tazir, and similarly 
some crimes are considered both Qissas and Tazir.148 For instance, 
theft is a crime under both Tazir and Hudod. When the value of a 
 
142 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 26. 
143 Etim E. Okon, Hudud punishments in Islamic Criminal Law, 10 E. S. J. 227, 228 
(2014). 
144 Islamic Law, Sharia and Fiqh, supra note 141, at 6. 
145 Tellenbach, supra note 97, at 932. 
146 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 26. 
147 Id. 
148 Okon, supra note 143, at 228. 
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stolen item is below a certain threshold,149 a thief may be punished 
with Tazir instead of under the Hudod punishment scheme. Stealing a 
bottle of water, for example, would not deserve Hadd punishment. 
A sexual crime, which is essentially a Hudod crime, might be 
punished through Tazir when it doesn’t rise to the level of intercourse. 
In addition, when the evidence in a case does not satisfy the strict 
requirements for Hudod proof, a person might be punished with 
Tazir.150 For instance, the required evidence in fornication cases is 
confession from the defendant plus four credible eyewitnesses.151 If 
that specific level of evidence is not available, the crime can still be 
classified as Tazir. However, under Tazir the punishment would be 
less severe than under Hudod. 
Article 1 of Penal Code of Afghanistan specifies that Hudod cases 
must be decided in accordance with Hanafi Jurisprudence; however, 
the code does not specify the number of Hudod crimes that exist. 
There are seven Hodud crimes, four of which are punishable by death 
in special circumstances: adultery, apostasy, armed robbery, and 
rebellion.152 Although these crimes have fixed punishment under 
Islamic law, various Islamic schools have differing points of view 
regarding available affirmative defenses and interpretations of the 
requirements for these crimes.153 
It is much more difficult to prove Hadd crimes because many Hadd 
crimes cannot be proven by circumstantial evidence. These high 
evidentiary safeguards and limitations on construction of the law 
decrease the chance of successful prosecution of Hadd 
punishments.154 For instance, the required evidence to prove adultery 
is confession by the defendant plus four eyewitnesses.155 The 
defendant can withdraw a confession any time before the execution of 
 
149 Threshold is 10 Sharia Dirham, which is equivalent to approximately 4.5 grams gold 
or 31.5 grams of silver. 
150 Okon, supra note 143, at 228. 
151 IBN TAIMIYYA ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW IN ISLAM OR PUBLIC POLICY IN 
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 117 (Omar A. Farrukh trans., Khayat 1st ed. 1966). 
152 Elizabeth Peiffer, The Death Penalty in Traditional Islamic Law and as Interpreted 
in Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 507, 509 (2005); also see 
generally Una Au et al., supra note 16, at 89. 
153 Peiffer, supra note 152, at 509. 
154 Id. at 515. 
155 IBN TAIMIYYA, supra note 151, at 117. 
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the punishment.156 The witnesses must have good character and 
should have seen the crime as it happened. Providing false testimony 
regarding crime is punishable by eighty lashes.157 In addition, Islamic 
schools do not accept the testimony of women in cases of adultery 
tried under Hadd.158 Notably, unlike other Hudod crimes, apostasy 
can be proven by circumstantial evidence.159 
Although often harsh, the use of Hudod punishment does not 
violate the principle of legality because clear notice has been given to 
the people of society. Citizens already know the list of Hudod crimes 
and the punishments assigned to each crime.160 The burden of proof is 
common knowledge as well. Hadd crimes, their punishments, and the 
burdens of proof are immutable, even to the judiciary. 
a. Relevant Constitutional Provisions and Codes 
The principle of legality is expressed through Article 27 of the 
Afghan Constitution, and Articles 2 and 3 of the 1976 Penal Code. As 
explained in the introduction to this Article, Article 27(2) of the 
Afghan Constitution states, “no person can be pursued, arrested or 
detained save in accordance with the provisions of law. In addition, 
no person can be punished except in accordance with the decision of a 
competent court and in conformity with the law adopted before the 
date of offence.”161 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Penal Code echo the Afghan Constitution. 
Articles 2 and 3 state generally that no act shall be considered a 
crime, unless it is in accordance with statute.162 No one can be 
punished but in accordance with the provisions of a statute that has 
been enacted before commitment of the act under reference.163  
Under Article 21 of the 2014 Criminal Procedure Code, evidence 
deemed inadmissible due to violating the provisions of this law or 
other enforced laws shall be taken out of the file and stamped. This 
 
156 Peiffer, supra note 152, at 510. 
157 Id. 
158 IBN TAIMIYYA ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW IN ISLAM OR PUBLIC POLICY IN 
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 117 (Omar A. Farrukh trans., Khayat 1st ed. 1966). 
159 Peiffer, supra note 152, at 512. 
160 See generally KAMALI, supra note 10. 
161 GHOLAMI, supra note 71, at 155. 
162 QANUNI JAZAI JUMHURI AFGHANISTAN [PENAL CODE OF REPUBLIC OF 
AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 347 1355 (1976). 
163 QANUNI ASSASI JUMHURI ISLMAI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 818 1382 (2004). 
HASHIMI (DO NOT DELETE) 8/29/2017  12:34 PM 
2017] Defending the Principle of Legality in Afghanistan: 209 
Toward a Unified Interpretation of Article 130 
to the Afghan Constitution 
evidence and all related documents shall be maintained separately 
from other evidence and documents.164 In light of these provisions, 
law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities may not conduct any 
arrests, detention, or searches unless in accordance with specific, 
existing rules of criminal procedure. 165 
In the following sections, this Article explains how the principle of 
legality and its related doctrine have been articulated in the various 
constitutions of Afghanistan. 
(i) Before the 2004 Constitution 
Article 64 of the 1964 Constitution of Afghanistan required 
parliament to enact law in compliance with the principles of Islam.166 
Accordingly, judges had to base their decisions on the laws that were 
passed by parliament.167 Hence, the Constitution required judges to 
decide only based on the enacted laws; however, in accordance with 
Article 102, the judges had discretion to refer to Hanafi jurisprudence 
when there were no statutes to cover the case before the judge.168 The 
unconsolidated state of manuals of Fiqh and the diversity of opinions 
within Hanafi jurisprudence have created problems of inconsistency 
and unpredictability in court practices—courts rely on the views of 
different scholars within the Hanafi School of Jurisprudence. This 
also leads to problems of the consistency of the Hanafi jurisprudence 
with the Constitution, which creates serious obstacles for judges to 
decide which one to prioritize. 
The principle of legality was also expressly incorporated into the 
Constitution of 1964; in accordance with Article 26 of this 
Constitution, no action is considered a crime unless defined as a crime 
by an enacted law prior to the commission of the act.169 Accordingly, 
no one shall be punished without the decision of an authoritative court 
 
164 QANUNI IJRAHATI JAZA-E-JUMHURI ISLMAI AFGHANISTAN [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CODE OF REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 1132 1393 (2014). 
165 QANUNI IJRAHATI JAZA-E- JUMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE CODE] Official Gazette No. 1132. 1393 (2014). 
166 QANUNI ASSASSI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] Official 
Gazette No. 12 1343 (1964). 
167 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 6. 
168 QANUNI ASSASSI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] Official 
Gazette No. 12 1343 (1964). 
169 Id. 
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following the provisions of the enacted law, which had to have been 
promulgated prior to commitment of the offense.170 
The adoption of the principle of legality in the 1964 Constitution 
was ahead of its time; at that time, Afghanistan did not have any 
developed codified penal statutes.171 The first Penal Code was enacted 
in 1976, a year before the adoption of the 1977 Constitution of 
Afghanistan. And similar to Article 102 of the 1964 Constitution, 
Article 99 of the 1977 Constitution stated the following: 
When there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws 
regarding ruling on an issue, the court’s decisions shall be within 
the limits of this Constitution in compliance with basics principles 
of Hanafî jurisprudence and, within the limits set by this 
Constitution, rule in a way that attains justice in the best manner.172 
Under this Article, judges were allowed to apply the basic 
principles of Hanafi Fiqh to ensure justice; however, because the 
legislature had begun to enact statutes in the form of the Penal Code, 
there was a question of whether, because the legislature began to 
codify law, judges should not have the power to criminalize Tazir 
crimes. 173 
(ii) 2004 Constitution and Current Penal Codes 
The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan provides individual rights of 
citizens in the second chapter. Included in these rights is the right to 
be informed of prohibited actions or omissions and their punishments. 
For example, Article 27 requires the government of Afghanistan to 
specify all crimes and the punishment of each crime in statutory laws; 
if there are no statutes regarding an action or omission, prosecution is 
considered illegal.174 In short, there is no crime or punishment for 
conduct unless the law expressly forbids it. 
Elsewhere in the Constitution, however, there is a significant 
retreat from the principles of Article 27. As explained above, Article 
130 states that when there is no rule in the Constitution and statutory 
law regarding a specific case, Islamic law under the Hanafi School of 
 
170 Id. 
171 KAMALI, supra note 132, at 45−46. 
172 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 360 1356 (1977). 
173 Alexander, supra note 67, at 577. 
174 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 818 1382 (2004). 
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Jurisprudence may be invoked.175 There is simply an unclear path to 
reconciling these two provisions, and one cannot help but notice that 
certain readings of them undermine the principle of legality.176 
A partial reconciliation can be read into Article 130. One scholar 
points out that Article 130’s use of the phrase, “within the limits set 
by this Constitution,”177 can be read in conjunction with Article 27 to 
bar the application of Article 130 to criminal cases and exclude 
punishment for behaviors not set forth in the codified laws of 
Afghanistan. At an international workshop regarding gender and 
criminal justice in Afghanistan, held in 2006, Fazal Ahmad Manawa 
and Advisor Minister Ashraf Rasooli, two expert former Deputy 
Presidents of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan who have broad 
knowledge of Sharia law and statutory laws, stated that Article 130 of 
the 2004 constitution does not apply to criminal cases; instead, it 
should apply only in civil cases.178 
Nevertheless, as illustrated in the case discussions in the following 
section, criminal courts of Afghanistan frequently argue that this 
Article does in fact give them the discretion to convict and sentence 
defendants for Tazir crimes when there is no Penal Code provision. 
C. How Judges Use Article 130 to Justify Punishments Under Tazir 
The criminal courts of Afghanistan have used Article 130 of the 
Constitution to convict and punish defendants in more than a 
thousand criminal cases in which the judge relied on Hanafi 
jurisprudence. Examples of these cases include mundane activities 
like those involved in runaway cases, and the selling of Haram 
animals as meat. For each of these, there is no specific rule in the 
Penal Code that defines the act as a crime. Having not been formally 
recognized as a crime, there can be no attendant punishment assigned. 
Instead, the punishments handed out by judges are based on social 
norms and the demands of the people in the community. The 
following are some examples of Tazir cases in which the criminal 
courts justified their decisions on Article 130. 
 
175 Id. 
176 UNA AU ET AL., supra note 16, at 25. 
177 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 16. 
178 Id. at 25. 
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1. Case of Sayed Perwiz Kambakhsh 
In October 2007, Sayed Perwiz Kambakhsh, a student at Balkh 
University and a journalist for Jahan-e Naw (New World), was 
arrested for downloading and publishing materials “offensive to 
Islam.” Kambakhsh had written criticism about certain Quranic verses 
about women.179 He was accused of blasphemy.180 The punishment 
for blasphemy varies among different schools of jurisprudence. 
Different schools take into consideration whether the perpetrator is 
Muslim or non-Muslim, or man or woman. Depending on the level of 
blasphemy, the punishment can be fines, imprisonment, flogging, 
amputation, hanging, or beheading.181 For example, injuring or 
defiling places of worship with the intent to insult the religion might 
deserve fine or imprisonment, while use of derogatory remarks in 
respect of the prophet Mohammad might deserve death. 
In Kambakhsh’s case, local religious leaders demanded that he be 
executed. The prosecutor asked the primary criminal court of Balkh 
province to convict and sentence Kambakhsh under Article 130 of 
Constitution, arguing that the judge could decide the case under 
Hanafi Jurisprudence because it was Tazir.182 Initially, the primary 
criminal court sentenced Kambakhsh to death, reasoning that he had 
confessed to blasphemy.183 
However, Kambakhsh eventually denounced his confession, 
claiming his confession was a product of torture. Following an outcry 
from the international community, which deemed the conviction and 
sentence a human rights violation, his sentence was commuted to 
twenty years imprisonment, a sentence upheld by the Supreme Court 
 
179 John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, Religious Freedom, Democracy, and 
International Human Rights, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 583 (2009); see also Afghan 
‘Blasphemy’ Death Sentence, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/72 
04341.stm (last updated Jan. 23, 2008). 
180 Id. at 583. 
181 See Robert Postawko, Towards an Islamic Critique of Capital Punishment, 1 UCLA 
J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 269, 314 (2002). 
182 Notably, the prosecutor also asked that the court to convict Kambakhsh under 
Article 347 of the Penal Code. Article 347 of the Afghan Penal Code, however, defines 
certain crimes against religion and prescribes punishment of cash fines and midterm 
imprisonment for up five years. While Article 347 would appear to limit any sentence in 
Kambakhsh’s case, the court clearly disregarded this provision or determined that it did 
not apply. 
183 Witte & Green, supra note 179, at 583; see also Afghan ‘Blasphemy’ Death 
Sentence, supra note 179. 
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of Afghanistan.184 Notably in September 2009, then President Karzai 
pardoned Kambakhsh, and he is since believed to have left the 
country.185 
The Court virtually made two rulings in Kambakhsh’s case. First 
the Court had to deem his act blasphemy, which is an offense to Islam 
under Tazir. This decision by the Court allowed it to apply Article 
130 of the Constitution to sentence Kambakhsh using a Tazir 
punishment. 
2. Dog Meat Case 
There are many verses in Quran regarding Halal (permitted food) 
and explaining what meat would be considered Haram (food that is 
not permitted). One of the Hadith explaining these verses states that 
“Allah’s Messenger is prohibited to eat: every beast of prey that has a 
canine tooth and every bird that has a claw.”186 Given that dogs have 
canine teeth, they are considered Haram under Islamic law. Because 
Haram is a crime against Islam, the Court justified a conviction and 
sentence for a Tazir crime under Article 130 when defendants were 
accused of selling dog meat. 
The case arose when, in Herat province, police arrested three 
individuals who were accused of selling dog meat to people under the 
guise of sheep meat. The butchers association of Herat province and 
members of the community suggested harsh punishment for the 
defendants. They believed this action went against Islamic principles, 
and anyone who misused Islamic principles should be sentenced to 
the strongest punishment. They warned that if the government showed 
mercy or gave a lesser punishment, they would take action themselves 
and punish the individuals on their own.187 
Although eating dog meat is prohibited in Islam, there is no 
specific article in the Penal Code of Afghanistan regarding eating or 
selling dog meat or other haram. Nevertheless, the primary criminal 
court of Herat province convicted two of the defendants of “selling 
dog meat” and sentencing them to 15 years imprisonment; the third 
 
184 Witte & Green, supra note 179, at 584. 
185 Id. 
186 Imam Muslim, HALAL AND HARAM MEAT OR FOOD, http://www.islamweb.net 
/emainpage/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=84822 (last visited Feb. 
26, 2016). 
187 AFGHANISTAN MEDIA NETWORK, supra note 8. 
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was found to have only assisted with the crime and was, therefore, 
sentenced to only three-years imprisonment.188 The Court justified 
this ruling under Article 130 of the Constitution of Afghanistan, 
which ostensibly gives the court broad discretion in cases like this 
where the conduct is considered evil or against Islam. 
3. Runaway Cases 
Despite the fact that delegates of the Lawyers’ Union of 
Afghanistan have criticized practice of sentencing women to 
imprisonment in runaway cases, further instances in which Afghan 
courts have relied on Article 130 of the Constitution to prosecute 
young women and girls for having run away persists. 
There are many reasons why a young person might run away from 
home, including leaving the family to seek marriage on one’s own 
terms or escaping from domestic violence. According to the 2012 
Human Rights Watch report, up to 70 percent of the approximately 
700 female prisoners in Afghanistan have been imprisoned for 
running away, most of who fled because of forced marriage or 
domestic violence.189 In Pul-Charkhi prison, 20 out of 80 women in 
detention were convicted, with sentences of up to 14 years 
imprisonment, for running away from home.190 
While Islam may not expressly prohibit running away from home, 
it is considered to run counter to Islamic principles. This is so 
because, in Afghanistan, running away is presupposed to indicate 
crimes like adultery and prostitution. Neither is “running away” a 
crime under the Afghan Penal Code. Yet, law enforcement authorities 
often arrest, jail, and even prosecute girls for running away, usually 
qualifying the charge as “intention” to commit adultery (zina) which 
is a crime under the Penal Code as well.191 
Afghan courts have justified conviction and punishment for 
running away based on a determination that runaway cases are 
classifiable as Tazir under Hanafi jurisprudence. In 2010 and 2011 the 
 
188 KHAAMA PRESS, supra note 9. 
189 Free Women Jailed for “Running Away,” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/505c1c852.html. 
190 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 25. 
191 UNAMA, Harmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law on 
Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan 37 (Dec. 9, 2010); see also Isaac 
Kfir, Feminist Legal Theory As A Way to Explain the Lack of Progress of Women’s Rights 
in Afghanistan: The Need for A State Strength Approach, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 87, 136 (2014). 
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Supreme Court of Afghanistan issued guidance about runaway cases 
to the criminal courts.192 The Supreme Court confirmed that running 
away, even in cases of abuse, “could cause crimes like adultery and 
prostitution and is against Sharia principles.”193 The Court determined 
that the act is “prohibited and prosecutable based on discretionary 
punishment” because the behavior could be classified as Tazir.194 The 
following are examples of how the courts use the language of Article 
130 to convict individuals of crimes that are not codified. 
In one case, a man from Logar province of Afghanistan married his 
16-year-old daughter to an elderly man.195 Because of this situation, 
the daughter ran away with a boy to another province of 
Afghanistan.196 The primary court sentenced her to seven years 
imprisonment and transferred her to a juvenile correction center in 
Kabul.197 
In another case, as reported by Human Rights Watch, a 16-year-old 
girl fell in love with a school friend’s brother. The boy asked her 
family if they would allow him to marry their daughter; however, her 
family refused. The boy’s mother suggested that the girl run away 
with the boy, which would force her father to agree to the marriage. 
She did not agree to run away at the time, but later her father arranged 
to marry her with another boy. Because of her father’s decision, she 
decided to run away with her lover.198 
In 2011, they ran away to the boy’s cousin’s house in a different 
region. After fleeing, she called her brother to tell her father that she 
ran away. Her brother told her to return and said that her family 
would finally let her to marry the boy.199 They decided to return, but 
at a checkpoint the police realized that they were not married and 
arrested them both. The girl was convicted for running away and 
sentenced to two years in a juvenile facility. The boy was released, 
 
192 “I HAD TO RUN AWAY” The Imprisonment of Women and Girls for “Moral 
Crimes” in Afghanistan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2011), https://www.hrw.org/report 
/2012 /03/28/i-had-run-away/imprisonment-women-and-girls-moral-crimes-afghanistan. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 UNAMA, Harmful Traditional Practices, supra note 191, at 37. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. After being arrested, she was detained in Logar Juvenile Correction Center 
where she was allegedly raped. Id. 
198 I HAD TO RUN AWAY, supra note 192. 
199 Id. 
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she said, because his family paid a bribe and “knew someone in the 
police.”200 She stayed in prison for the duration of her sentence.201 
Because of growing criticism regarding charging women and girls 
with running away, despite an abiding disdain in the culture for the 
conduct, the way of charging these women has shifted toward 
attempted zina.202 The assumption and justification for this 
classification is that women who run away without their male 
relatives must have attempted to have sex.203 Accordingly, when a 
young woman has been arrested in a runaway case, the police 
sometimes order virginity tests to determine whether the girl was 
engaged in recent sexual intercourse.204 The court then relies on the 
results of those tests as evidence.205 These exams are ordered as a 
matter of course, without the consent of girls, and some girls are 
subjected to multiple gynecological exams.206 
Prosecution of runaway cases has been criticized by local human 
rights activists and by international observers, including the UN 
mission to Afghanistan.207 UNAMA and the civil societies 
recommend that the president of Afghanistan and the Supreme Court 
issue a decree to stop prosecution of these cases.208 As a result, on 
April 11, 2012, the Attorney Generals’ Office issued a directive 
stating that “running away” is not a crime under penal statutes and 
should not be prosecuted.209 The directive states that: 
A circulation must be prepared and shared with all relevant 
prosecution offices in the center and provinces and the prosecutors 
should be instructed not to prepare unjustifiable case files regarding 
running away cases that have not been criminalized under 
Afghanistan laws and cannot be heard by courts and refrain from 
conducting baseless investigations. Other circumstances where 
people run away to commit any other crime are not covered by this 
instruction. The issue is being communicated to you so that you can 
 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
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take action in accordance with instruction of the High Council of 
Attorney General Office of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.210 
This text clarifies that running away must not be prosecuted, but 
still it leaves the gap for misuses with the inclusion of the exception: 
“Other circumstances where people runaway to commit any other 
crime are not covered.”211 
In addition, the international interveners also asked the Supreme 
Court of Afghanistan to clarify whether running away because of 
domestic violence would constitute a crime. As a result, the high 
council of Supreme Court212 issued a decree that states: 
There is a difference between being a runaway and committing a 
crime. The action of those who leave home because of family 
violation and go to judiciary, law enforcement organizations, legal 
aid organizations, or their relatives’ home does not constitute crime. 
A large number of girls because of family violation are living in 
shelters; therefore, running away in this situation must not be 
prosecuted. However, running away for the purposes of moral 
crimes or other purposes considered crime shall be prosecuted. In 
this case the law enforcement agencies must not use the term 
“runaway.” Rather, they must find the description for the committed 
act form in the statutory laws. Courts and the attorney general office 
shall use the specific term for the committed crime and avoid the 
term “runaway.”213 
This decree was sent to all lower level courts, which were directed 
to apply it by January 13, 2013.214 
Despite these decrees, individuals are still prosecuted for running 
away from home. Just recently in 2015, four girls--two sisters, their 
relative, and a friend, all decided to run away from home together 
because of domestic violence. They bought airline tickets and spent 
the night at their friend’s home. The next day, police arrested them at 
the Kabul National airport, where they were trying to fly to another 
province of Afghanistan.215 
 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Date of issuance 1391/09/7 (Nov. 27, 2012). 
213 This is the author’s translation of the decree. The original decree is in Dari and is on 
file with the author. 
214 By the solar calendar on 1391/10/24. 
215 RUNNING AWAY CASE, PRIMARY CRIMINAL COURT OF KABUL CITY, 2 (2015). 
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The prosecutor accused two of the girls for “running away” and 
“zina.” In that case, virginity tests were done, and the prosecutor filed 
a separate case for one of the girls because she alleged zina by 
force.216 However, for the others, the prosecutor recommended that 
the primary court punish the girls for “running away” based on 
Article 130 of the Constitution. 217 
In the end, the primary courts did not charge them for attempted 
zina because of a lack of evidence for the elements of the crime; 
however, the courts convicted them of running away from home 
based on Article 130 and decided that the time they spent in the 
detention center was sufficient and they should be released. The 
prosecutor appealed against this decision, but the appellate court 
affirmed the decision of primary court.218 
IV 
WHAT AFGHANS CAN DO TO PROTECT THE PRINCIPLE OF 
LEGALITY 
Many judges and scholars, including this author, agree that, when 
read together, Articles 130 and 27 of the 2004 Afghan Constitution do 
not permit judges to exercise discretion in convicting and punishing 
for Tazir crimes.219 Rather, Tazir crimes should be the sole province 
of the legislature. Nevertheless, this issue continues to be 
controversial, and there remain proponents of allowing judicial 
discretion under Article 130. Those who favor permitting judges to 
decide criminal cases based on Article 130, in the absence of a statute 
or other law, claim that judges should have broad discretion to fill in 
the gaps left by the legislature.220 In their view, it is not possible to 
foresee all potential crimes, and the legislature may forget to include 
some serious crimes that deserve prosecution and punishment under 
principles of Islam.221 
 
216 Id. at 3. See also I HAD TO RUN AWAY, supra note 192, at 44. 
217 The prosecutor also asked for prosecution under Article 427 (zina) and Article 29 
(attempt to crime) of penal code. 
218 RUNNING AWAY CASE, supra note 215. 
219 See, e.g., Interview with Mohammad Ashraf Rasooli, Advisor to the Ministry of 
Justice, in Kabul, Afghanistan (Nov. 10, 2015); Interview with Mohammad Zaman 
Sangari, Judge Appellate Court for the Province of Kabul, in Kabul, Afghanistan (Nov. 12, 
2015); Interview with Nasrullah Stanekzai, Professor of Law and Advisor for the President 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, in Kabul, Afghanistan (Nov. 2, 2015). 
220 RASOLI, supra note 13, at 148−50. 
221 Id. at 150. 
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This Article maintains that the controversy persists primarily 
because of discrepancies in judicial education and societal attitudes, 
and that in order to increase accuracy, consistency, and reliability in 
criminal cases, the Afghan government must implement more judicial 
training on the relationship between Islam and the Afghan Penal 
Code. As part of this cause, the government must support an effort to 
develop a system of secondary sources, like annotated codes, legal 
encyclopedias, and treatises, to help shape future practice and bring 
more stability and consistency to judicial interpretation and rule of 
law. In addition, Afghan legislators should emulate the approaches of 
Egypt and Iran and amend the Penal Code to clarify that all 
potentially criminal actions associated with Tazir fall under the Penal 
Code, and that when there is no provision describing an offense, none 
is recognized or punishable through the legal system. If society deems 
certain behavior criminal, then the legislature must pass legislation to 
that effect before anyone can be convicted or punished for it. 
A. Social Norms Affecting Interpretation and the Egyptian and Iran 
Model 
Under Islamic law, social norms play an important role in a judge’s 
determination of the need for criminal sanctions for Tazir. 
Mohammed Salam Madkoar makes the following observation: 
Tazir punishments vary according to the circumstances. They 
change from time to time and from place to place. They vary 
according to the gravity of the crime and the extent of the criminal 
disposition of the criminal himself. Tazir crimes are acts that are 
punished because the offender disobeys God’s law and word. Tazir 
crimes can be punished if they harm the social interest. Shar’iah 
Law places an emphasis on the social or public interest. The 
assumption of the punishment is that a greater “evil” will be 
prevented in the future if you punish this offender now.222 
This relationship between legal norms and social norms is inherent 
in the concept of Tazir. In most Islamic law cases, legal norms are 
applied in compliance with social norms. For instance, punishing a 
thief involves applying an existing law that criminalizes the conduct, 
the legal norm, and the punishment comports with public scorn for the 
act, the social norm. However, the perceived need for action under 
Tazir arises when the social norm opposes conduct where there is no 
 
222 Id. 
HASHIMI (DO NOT DELETE) 8/29/2017  12:34 PM 
220 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 18, 185 
established legal norm. In runaway cases and dog meat cases, for 
example, the legal norm would have required the release of the 
offenders because their actions were not criminalized by state law; 
nevertheless, the social norm demanded punishment because the 
actions offended the sensibilities of society because the prosecution is 
usually prepared on the basis that running away is considered 
preparation for adulatory. 
Generally, the purpose of Hudod crimes and their punishments in 
Islamic society is the protection of public interest, property, security, 
and the moral value of Muslim society.223 In contemporary Islamic 
states, the legislative branch struggles to protect social interests by 
codifying Tazir offences with appropriate punishment.224 A legislature 
in an Islamic country may criminalize an act if the public interest 
demands it, and the level of public interest may also affect the limit of 
discretion of the judge when considering a Tazir crime. 225 
One problem with moving in the direction of codification of Tazir 
crimes and clarification about judicial discretion in criminal cases is 
the administrability. The Egyptian criminal justice system, for 
example, which integrated Islamic jurisprudence into its statutory law, 
could be a good model for Afghan reform on this issue. The Egyptian 
reform could be considered in line with both the international human 
rights conventions that Egypt has signed and Islam.226 Egypt was 
largely successful because of the training judges receive in Islamic 
law—it is a modernist version of Islam that attempts to reconcile 
Islam with liberal rights and values.227 Because most Afghan judges 
receive trainings like the Egyptian judges, the Egyptian model might 
be considerably useful in Afghanistan. In addition, as stated in 
previous sections, in Iran there were controversial perceptions 
between Islamic scholars regarding the codification of Tazir crime, a 
problem that was finally solved when the Iranian government codified 
Tazir crime. 
 
223 Awwa, supra note 50, at 127−32. 
224 Id. at 135. 
225 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 160. 
226 Maurits Berger & Nadia Sonneveld, Sharia and national law in Egypt, in SHARIA 
INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE 
MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 51 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010). 
227 See generally Clark Lombardi & Nathan Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring 
Adherence to Shari’a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court 
Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 379 
(2006). 
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The government of Afghanistan could invite Afghan’s Islamic 
scholars along with Islamic scholars from other countries to draft 
statutes and include all, or reasonably all, actions or omissions that 
they think constitute a crime under Tazir jurisprudence. After the 
ratification of that law, it will be clear for everybody what act or 
omission is prohibited and what punishment is lawful. A concerted 
effort to employ the principle of legality would help Afghanistan’s 
courts avoid inconsistency, a lack of foreseeability, and other 
injustices that arise when the principle is disregarded. Generally, the 
rule of law in Afghanistan would benefit from a move to eliminate 
gaps in the judicial system. A unification of the law and principles of 
justice, considering the diversity within the Hanafi jurisprudence, 
should be done with the consideration of all sources of reference in 
the Islamic nation.228 
B. Addressing Differences in Judicial Education 
As explained above, those who graduate from Sharia schools tend 
to believe that Article 130 gives them broad discretion to punish all 
actions considered evil under Sharia—even for conduct that has no 
specified punishment under the Sharia or criminal sanction under 
statutory law—what they would consider to be Tazir crimes.229 In 
fact, some Sharia graduates go so far as to argue that there is no need 
for statutory laws at all because there are solutions for all cases in 
Sharia.230 These judges try to solve all cases, including Tazir cases, in 
accordance with Islamic jurisprudence (the Fiqh). They maintain that 
Islamic jurisprudence provides them with broad discretion, discretion 
that can sometimes even result in a violation of a defendant’s 
statutory or constitutional rights.231 
Judges trained in law schools, on the other hand, interpret these 
same provisions differently. In their view, by expressly distinguishing 
between Tazir crimes and Hudod, Qissas, and Diat crimes, Article 1 
of the Penal Code announces that judges do not have absolute 
discretion to criminalize an act classified as Tazir if it does not appear 
 
228 KAMALI, supra note 10, at 6. 
229 QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 818 1382 (2004). 
230 Ayoubi, supra note 87. 
231 Akimi, supra note 86. 
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in the Penal Code.232 They also emphasize the language of Article 2 
of the Penal Code, which seems to take this rule even further, stating 
that “[n]o act is considered a crime unless specified by the provision 
of the law.”233 Article 3 of the Penal Code also lends support to this 
position by stating that “[n]o one may be punished except under the 
rulings of a law that have been put into force prior to perpetration of 
the alleged crime.”234 As a result, when judges, who graduate from 
law schools, hear cases that could otherwise be classified as Tazir, 
they consider the statutory law and observe the rights of defendant as 
described by statutory law, and they do not tend to refer to Hanafi 
jurisprudence to fill any perceived gap. 
The root of this inconsistency between the perceptions of judges 
stems not just from differences in types of legal training, but also 
from a lack of professionalism and inadequate legal education, in 
general. In fact, some judges have obtained their positions in Afghan 
courts despite a lack of higher education of statutory law or Sharia 
law. Instead, they are graduates of Madrassas or high school. As a 
result, when they approach complex legal problems and laws, they are 
not able to do the analysis or find the relevant provisions. 
The aforementioned Kambakhsh case provides a good example of 
this lack of professionalism. In the Kambakhsh case, the prosecutor 
demanded punishment in accordance with Article 347 of the Penal 
Code, a crime accompanied by a prison sentence of no more than five 
years or a fine. Despite this relatively moderate sentence, the criminal 
court sentenced Kambakhsh to the death penalty. This case illustrates 
that the judiciary and attorney general’s office need a way to integrate 
more effective educational programing into its legal training systems 
across the board. 
One of the causes of this disparity in education is simply access to 
legal materials. In some rural areas of Afghanistan, there is even a 
shortage of copies of the enacted laws. In addition, there is little 
access to the Internet or any other means to find and consult legal 
sources. As such, this article recommends that the government of 
Afghanistan, with the help of NGOs, consider this problem and take 
steps to ensure that judges and law enforcement agencies have access 
to the materials they need to make correct decisions under the law. 
 
232 Knust & Afshar, supra note 117, at 594. 
233 QANUNI JAZAI JUMHURI AFGHANISTAN [PENAL CODE OF REPUBLIC OF 
AFGHANISTAN] Official Gazette No. 347 1355 (1976). 
234 Id. 
HASHIMI (DO NOT DELETE) 8/29/2017  12:34 PM 
2017] Defending the Principle of Legality in Afghanistan: 223 
Toward a Unified Interpretation of Article 130 
to the Afghan Constitution 
Both judicial training and access to legal sources such as statutes, 
bylaws, the constitution, treaties, conventions, legal encyclopedias, 
annotated statutes, and so on, is necessary to improve the quality of 
trials in Afghanistan. Providing materials would not work without 
qualitative legal education because access to materials will not solve 
the problem if people do not have the education or ability to 
understand those materials. Similarly, legal education without access 
to the sources would be detrimental to the quality of the education. 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that many judges and 
prosecutors lack the skills and experience to analyze more complex 
law in the first place.235 This lack of skill can lead to unfair justice and 
harsh punishments.236 As such, this Article suggests that the Supreme 
Court of Afghanistan provide more educational programs to the 
judges and instruct them on how to interpret provisions of law that 
support justice in the best manner. Further, the courts should 
encourage religious leaders and jurists to campaign for empowering 
the principle of legality and the rule of law to ensure the liberty of 
Afghanistan’s people. 
However, while some legal educational training has been held by 
NGOs for Afghan judges and prosecutors, these programs were short 
and for limited number of judges. Mostly, in such programs, the 
NGOs give the judge and prosecutors legal manuals, which are 
beneficial, but only a few judges and prosecutors can take benefit of 
such programs.237 Hence, a large number of judges and prosecutors 
still need training and access to legal sources. For instance, the Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative Law and International Law 
developed many manuals on civil, criminal, procedural, and 
constitutional issues and held some training for the judges and 
prosecutors.238 
Regardless of whether such programs are accessible to only a small 
number judges and prosecutors, one can argue that holding such a 
 
235 Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (Nov. 
17, 2010), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/reforming-afghanistan  
-s-broken-judiciary. 
236 Id. 
237 See, e.g., Justice Training Transition Program (JTTP), INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT LAW ORGANIZATION, http://www.idlo.int/what-we-do/initiatives 
/afghanistans-justice-training-transition-program-jttp (last visited June 6, 2017). 
238 MANDANA KNUST RASSEKH AFSHAR, THE MAX PLANCK MANUAL ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Vol. 2, 2007). 
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short-term training program cannot solve the problem unless the 
program is extended to every province and district court and general 
attorney offices and provide them with sources that help to analyze 
the statute and find the appropriate provisions.239 
Even if the government of Afghanistan provides collections of 
statutes to the prosecutors and judges, this alone would not solve the 
problem. Access to materials that assist with interpretation, such as 
annotated statutes, legal encyclopedias, and treatises on constitutional 
interpretation would be an essential step toward supporting 
consistency among the decisions of judges and courts. These sources 
could also help lawyers, and prosecutors in particular, to normalize 
which cases they bring and how they charge. 
Secondary sources like annotated statutes, legal encyclopedias, and 
treatises on constitutional interpretation could provide important 
commentary on how a law evolved, what is means, and how it should 
be applied in future cases. In addition, it could be helpful to create an 
annotated statute with illustrations, similar to the format modeled by 
the Restatement series from the United States, where the committee 
could show how the law would apply to different hypothetical 
scenarios. 
To begin the process of creating these sources, the Supreme Court 
could appoint a body of respected professionals, lawyers, judges, and 
academics from both law and Sharia schools. They should be tasked 
with coming to some consensus on interpretations of the individual 
provisions of the code, and when necessary, they should offer 
different, but well-reasoned interpretations reflective of different 
schools of thought. At the same, however, these groups of experts 
should follow a reasonable interpretation of the law. These resources 
would help prosecutors, judges, and even defense lawyers to 
understand the meaning of statutory and constitutional previsions. 
To achieve this goal, a panel of respected professionals and 
lawyers as well as academics in law and Sharia schools should be 
established to supplement, by collaboration and cooperation, the 
modest materials that have previously been offered by NGOs and 
academics. In interpreting the Fiqh, judges should give priority to the 
statutes that have the most usage in the courts of Afghanistan, 
especially those that have created problems because of controversial 
interpretations and inferences that arise from confusion over the 
 
239 Much of the information in this respect is based on the direct experience of the 
author. 
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relationship between the Constitutional provisions discussed here, as 
well as many other provisions of the Penal Code. Investing in legal 
resources would not only increase the knowledge of judges, 
prosecutors, and other practitioners, but also, the process of working 
together to interpret and comment on the Penal Code may reveal 
weaknesses and ambiguities in the statutory provisions themselves. 
Developing these sources not only will require cooperation among 
the judiciary, academia, and the government, but also will necessitate 
time and expense, which may fall outside the capacity of the Afghan 
government on its own. Many international NGOs have previously 
assisted the judiciary and the Attorney General’s Office in the legal 
capacity building arena. While on the financial end, this effort could 
be assisted by NGOs, strong leadership from the Supreme Court and 
knowledgeable and respected lawyers and academics would be 
needed for the sources to gain respect and prominence. 
This would be an ambitious project, to say the least. And while 
finding the financial resources to make this project work may be 
challenging, finding consensus among the perceptions of Sharia 
experts with law professionals will likely prove to be even more 
difficult. Participants in the project would need strong 
encouragement, not only to work together, but also to find consensus 
for the benefit of the public interest and, ultimately, for compliance 
with Islamic principles and the development of rule of law in 
Afghanistan. It will require strong leadership and commitment from 
all participating constituents. 
Using its power to interpret the Constitution, the Supreme Court 
should issue a decree that should clarify the meaning and scope of 
Article 130 of the Constitution. More specifically, it is important that 
the Court clarify that Article 130 only applies to civil and commercial 
cases. The application of Article 130 to criminal cases undermines 
rule of law and the principle of the legality of crimes and 
punishments. 
CONCLUSION 
The internationally recognized principle of legality leads to a 
proper balance between the rights of individuals and the needs of 
society. In Islam, the principle of legality requires that no action or 
omission shall be considered Hudod, Qissas, Diat, or Tazir unless 
clearly forbidden by law prior to the committed action in question. 
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This principle is also embedded in Article 27 of the Constitution of 
Afghanistan, which requires prosecution of criminal cases strictly in 
compliance with law. It also obliges judges and law enforcement 
agencies to avoid arbitrariness while prosecuting criminal cases. 
In Afghanistan, too often judges disregard the principle of legality 
when it comes to Tazir cases, cases where there is no statutory 
provision that describes conduct society condemns. In such cases, 
Afghan courts have relied on the Hanafi jurisprudence as directed 
under Article 130 of the Constitution. Hanafi jurisprudence therefore 
serves to fill the gap when there is no statute or constitutional 
provision on point. Despite the language of Article 130 itself, this 
practice is questionable in criminal cases because of the presence of 
the principle of legality in the Afghan Constitution and in Islam. 
However, the criminal courts of Afghanistan have long been relying 
on Article 130 to prosecute criminal cases that the legislature has not 
described—cases of runaway, selling Haram meat, and blasphemy, 
among others. 
This Article argues that this way of legislating, ex post facto, sits 
uncomfortably with a government that is supported by an 
international community that subscribes to the principle of legality. 
Prosecutions under Article 130 of the Constitution have at times 
caused the international community to threaten to stop their support. 
The persistence of this inconsistency in the criminal justice system 
of Afghanistan stems from the lack of professionalism, access to 
quality legal education and materials, and different interpretations of 
law. Thus, this Article recommends initiating supplemental training 
for judges on the meaning of Articles 27 and 130. In addition, it 
recommends that the Supreme Court of Afghanistan issue a decree 
clarifying that Article 130 concerns only civil and commercial cases. 
 
